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THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE BIAS ON 




Marilyn R. Walter and Elizabeth Fajans† 
 
Research into the psychology of decision-making has 
demonstrated that people rely on mental shortcuts to ease the 
burden of processing complex and ambiguous information. These 
shortcuts, known as heuristics and biases, sometimes lead to faulty 
judgments because they are naturalistic and intuitive (involving, 
for example, “gut instincts” and personal experience) rather than 
rational consideration of the information presented. 
The legal profession has explored the role of cognitive biases 
in many domains, ranging from their influence on jury and 
judiciary decision-making to their impact on negotiation. This 
symposium, The Impact of Cognitive Bias on Persuasion and 
Writing Strategies, refocused the discussion by looking at the 
function and role of cognitive bias in legal writing. It explored both 
the persuasive power and the related ethical challenges of 
cognitive bias in this realm, with an emphasis on improving legal 
writing and legal writing strategies. The panels, which were 
moderated by Marilyn Walter and Elizabeth Fajans, exemplified 
the myriad ways cognitive bias influences audience.  
Lawrence Solan’s opening paper, Four Reasons to Teach 
Psychology to Legal Writing Students, explains that the heuristics 
we use to reason efficiently and to good ends can also lead to 
errors in reasoning and judgment because we all have 
psychological propensities—cognitive biases—that undermine 
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logical reasoning. He argues that teaching students about the 
cognitive propensities that interfere with effective communication 
may help them to understand the underlying grounds for their 
teachers’ criticisms and suggestions, to master basic legal writing 
skills, and to assist them in transferring those skills to other legal 
tasks. 
Solan focuses on four biases that play out in legal documents. 
Knowledge of these, he argues, enables lawyers to adjust their 
writing, and, within ethical bounds, to stave off or exploit them. 
These include the psychological propensity to appreciate plain, 
simple writing; the confirmation bias, which is a tendency to seek 
and value conclusions already reached at the expense of contrary 
evidence; the correspondence bias, which is an inclination to 
overemphasize the importance of a person’s character and to 
underemphasize the effect of context on conduct; and the bias 
blind spot, which make it harder for us to recognize our own biases 
than to recognize the biases of others. Solan concludes with some 
suggestions on how to introduce these concepts in the legal writing 
classroom with exercises that will motivate students to internalize 
their lessons. 
Michael R. Smith argues in The Sociological and Cognitive 
Dimensions of Policy-based Persuasion that familiarity with the 
mental processes involved in policy-based persuasion enables 
advocates to produce more effective policy arguments and to 
appreciate the differences between policy arguments and deductive 
rule-based reasoning. Because policy arguments advocate for a 
new rule advancing or protecting a social value, the different or 
competing social values of judges can lead to more varied 
decisions from those based on deductive reasoning. They thus 
require greater awareness of how cognitive processes affect policy-
based decision-making. 
Smith explains four general cognitive processes relevant to 
policy-based persuasion and, within each of the four, explores 
specific cognitive strategies legal advocates can employ. . The first 
process is fear of future loss. According to Smith, policy 
arguments based on protecting a future social value are more 
effective than policy arguments applying to the case currently 
before the court as well as to future cases. Cognitive phenomena 
like the uncertainty effect and status quo bias indicate that 
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arguments that warn of future loss are more persuasive than those 
warning of immediate impact because the uncertainty that future 
predictions are imbued with increases fear. Second, policy-based 
persuasion is more likely to succeed if advocates prove the high 
probability of asserted consequences. They can effectively do so 
by using relevant non-legal materials and by exploiting cognitive 
processes like the conjunctive fallacy and the availability heuristic. 
Third, policy arguments depend on establishing the importance of 
the social value at stake. Several cognitive phenomena—loss 
aversion, the endowment effect, and the negative bias—suggest an 
advocate can enhance a decision-maker’s perceived importance of 
a value by phrasing arguments in terms of avoiding loss instead of 
acquiring a gain. The final cognitive process relevant to policy 
persuasion is memorability, requiring the persuader to use 
rhetorical strategies that highlight a point and render an argument 
more memorable to the reader. 
In What Cognitive Dissonance Tells Us about Tone in 
Persuasion, Kathryn Stanchi explains that advocacy often puts 
people in a state of cognitive dissonance, an uncomfortable 
psychological state where ambiguity, contradiction, and 
inconsistency cause people’s deeply held beliefs to clash. To 
eliminate that dissonance, that conflict, people respond either by 
changing their beliefs or behaviors, by rationalizing their beliefs or 
behavior, or by re-conceiving the situation or reality—that is, 
changing the narrative—to make it comport with their beliefs. 
Knowledge about these reactions to cognitive dissonance, she 
notes, can be put to rhetorical advantage if advocates are aware of 
what situations create dissonance and decide whether avoiding or 
resolving dissonance is most beneficial to the client. Thus, for 
example, an aggressive, hard-line message that creates dissonance 
may backfire because the recipient may think the argument is too 
one-sided to be true and begin looking for flaws. In this situation, it 
is better to avoid the dissonance and to take a more measured 
approach. Stanchi concludes that cognitive dissonance studies 
suggest that strategies that ease a person toward accepting a 
controversial claim are the surest way of dispelling cognitive 
discomfort and achieving the advocate’s goal. 
Daniel Medwed views cognitive bias in a different context in 
his essay The Good Fight: The Egocentric Bias, the Aversion to 
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Cognitive Dissonance and American Criminal Law. He first 
acknowledges that the phrase “cognitive bias” often has negative 
connotations. But he then suggests that for the criminal law 
practitioner, two interrelated cognitive biases—the egocentric bias 
and the aversion to cognitive dissonance—could be potential 
assets. He begins by describing the egocentric bias, in which 
people interpret information and envision themselves in ways that 
promote a positive self-image, regardless of whether that image is 
warranted. However, the need to maintain this positive self-image 
may lead people to minimize evidence that would detract from that 
image and create cognitive dissonance. Medwed illustrates this 
theory by focusing on the need of both defense attorneys and 
prosecutors to validate or even idealize their roles in the criminal 
process. This validation both creates a psychological shell that 
protects against indignities and builds a layer of confidence that 
empowers lawyers to convince others of the legitimacy of their 
positions.  Medwed sees this occurring as lawyers develop a theory 
of the case, determine which crime to charge at the plea bargaining 
stage, and present their case at trial – all important stages of the 
criminal justice system. 
In Metaphor and Analogy: The Sun and Moon of Legal 
Persuasion, Linda Berger suggests that novel characterizations and 
metaphors may compete with entrenched stereotypes (cognitive 
biases) and conventional categories and make the recipient open to 
new perspectives and narratives. This insight can aid lawyers in 
making conscious choices about persuasion.  Establishing a 
foundation for this argument, Berger first notes that according to 
social cognition researchers, we perceive and interpret new 
information by following a process of schematic cognition, in 
which the new data is analogized to the knowledge structures 
embedded in our memories.  Researchers have divided the next 
step, the decision-making process, into intuitive or analytic 
systems. Some researchers, like Daniel Kahneman, view intuition 
as often leading to decisions marked by mistakes and 
overconfidence. Others, represented by the experimental 
psychologist Gary Klein, point out the value of intuition during 
decision-making because it alerts the problem solver to an 
analogous pattern. Berger then applies these principles to the 
processing of analogy and metaphor, contrasting the work of 
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psychologist Dedre Gentner with that of linguist George Lakoff 
and philosopher Mark Johnson. For purposes of legal persuasion, 
she concludes that while conventional metaphors involve only the 
retrieval of automatic categories, interpretation of novel metaphors 
may prompt the reader to create meaning and prompt a new way of 
seeing. 
Berger then notes the differences between analogy and 
metaphor. Analogy, she states, has an explicit literal predictive or 
explanatory effect, e.g., a corporation is like a person. Metaphors 
are somewhat different. They vary more in structure than do 
analogies, may involve an ambiguous and more non-literal use of 
language, and are more associated with emotion and expression 
than analogy.  Applied to legal persuasion, since novel metaphors 
may cause the reader to see things in a different way, they are 
particularly useful to a lawyer in constructing a theory of the case, 
in framing what the audience perceives, and in channeling the 
audience’s interpretation of an event. Finally, Berger draws upon 
several case studies to illustrate how novel characterizations and 
metaphors may provide alternative schemas or structures to 
counter the effects of stereotypes, to prompt reflective comparison 
rather than automatic categorization within a particular context, 
and to activate a persuasive master story. 
In the final article, A Lawyer’s Hidden Persuader: Genre Bias, 
Bret Rappaport suggests that genre be considered a kind of 
cognitive bias. Like other cognitive biases, genre in the legal 
context may skew rational thought in two ways. It constrains the 
texts that lawyers and judges use in specific circumstances 
(criminal lawyers, patent lawyers, environmental lawyers, divorce 
judges), and it influences readers. Indeed, Rappaport reasons that 
the work of both lawyers and judges is limited by a highly 
structured set of conventions. 
Applying these theories, Rappaport turns first to two 
transactional document genres, patent applications and wills, to 
show how these highly structured genres function in the real legal 
world. For transactional documents, he recommends against never 
altering genre conventions, since these documents must be 
timeless, multi-purpose, and infinite. However, with persuasive 
documents, and in particular the appellate brief—a litigation sub-
genre—he somewhat modifies his advice. Although he recognizes 
6 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
the importance of reader expectations—here, the court— he 
acknowledges that a compelling reason may at times justify the 
risk of confounding reader expectations by breaking with 
convention. He concludes by stating that lawyers who view law 
and legal writing through the lens of genre bias will better 
understand how legal texts are “conceived, received, and 
perceived.” 
The Impact of Cognitive Bias on Persuasion and Writing 
Strategies took a valuable step towards encouraging the legal 
community to becoming informed about the cognitive heuristics 
and biases that invariably come into play when recipients read our 
legal documents. Hopefully, the work of these symposium 
panelists will motivate others to continue this critical dialogue.1 
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